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Figures released on 7 January by Eurostat indicate that inﬂation in the Eurozone turned negative in
December. But should we be concerned about deﬂation? As Gerhard Illing notes, some
economists have made the case that falling prices could have positive consequences, with the
recent fall in oil prices in particular constituting a positive supply shock. He argues however that
there are very real risks associated with persistent low inﬂation and that a complacent policy
response could set the Eurozone on a path toward long term stagnation.
In December 2014, headline inﬂation (technically the change in the ‘harmonised consumer price
index’ or HPCI) in the Eurozone became negative – the rate was 0.2 per cent lower than in December 2013. After a
peak at 3 per cent at the end of 2011, inﬂation has been falling steadily. Since 2013, the European Central Bank has
persistently undershot its target rate for inﬂation of below, but close to 2 per cent. In some periphery countries,
deﬂation seems to have become the new normal.
Part of the recent decline in inﬂation across the Eurozone is a temporary phenomenon – mainly the result of falling
energy prices. But core inﬂation (excluding energy and food) shows a similar trend, falling from 2 per cent at the end
of 2011 to 0.8 per cent in December 2014. More worryingly, inﬂation expectations (as measured according to the
ECB survey of professional forecasts) have also been falling recently: In Q2 2014, the two year ahead mean
forecast is now just 1.4 per cent (compared to 1.9 per cent in 2011). Even the 5 year forecast, which for a long time
has been well anchored at 2 per cent, recently declined to 1.8 per cent.
Should we be concerned about deﬂation in the Eurozone?
Some argue that falling prices are a good thing, allowing us simply to buy more stuﬀ. They see no evidence for a
risk of a sustained self- reinforcing deﬂationary spiral provided that long term inﬂation expectations stay positive.
Quite the contrary, they see the spectacular collapse of oil prices as a positive supply shock, boosting real income
across the whole Eurozone. Such complacency, however, ignores that slowing prices and stagnant wages are
mainly the result of a lack of demand due to a deep recession in large parts of the Eurozone. With unemployment
and real debt rising steadily, people in these regions simply cannot aﬀord to buy more stuﬀ. When investors reduce
their long-term growth expectations and start to adapt to weak growth and low inﬂation, growth pessimism is likely to
trigger adverse hysteresis eﬀects.
Certainly, in some parts of the Eurozone, the economy is booming. In Germany, the unemployment rate has come
down to a record low level not seen since the uniﬁcation boom in 1991. There is no sign that German workers
postpone purchase of durable consumption goods, expecting a steady decline of prices. So right now, the risk of a
sustained deﬂationary spiral is still low. Even in Japan, with inﬂation rates hovering around 0 per cent for more than
20 years such a devastating spiral has not been triggered. But this is not good news. In Japan well anchored long-
term inﬂation expectations (between 1999 and 2013, they stayed consistently more than one percentage point
above the actual average rate of inﬂation) did not help to prevent the Japanese economy from suﬀering over two lost
decades.
Persistently low rates of inﬂation are a reason to be seriously worried. What we really need to be concerned about is
the fact that despite fairly good times in the core countries, the target rate of 2 per cent across the Eurozone has
been missed for two years, with no visible sign of a reversal of the negative trend. Even in the boom areas, both
overall and core inﬂation have stayed signiﬁcantly below 2 per cent and are further declining (with 0.5 per cent HCPI
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and 0.9 per cent core inﬂation in November 2014 in
Germany). As long as overall Eurozone wide inﬂation
stays too low, monetary policy is simply too tight to
help smooth the internal adjustment process urgently
needed within the Euro area. Instead, it severely
hampers adjustment and recovery. With output below
potential since the start of the ﬁnancial crisis,
complacency with falling rates of inﬂation would be a
dangerous guide towards secular stagnation, with the
risk of one or even more lost decades.
The reasons are straightforward. Relative prices and
wages within the Eurozone need to adjust to make
periphery countries more competitive. Let’s try a
simple thought experiment and assume that the
weight of both core and periphery countries is one
half for the whole area. With wages and prices falling
by 2 per cent in periphery countries, wage and price
inﬂation in the core countries need to rise to 6 per cent in order to achieve the overall target of 2 per cent inﬂation.
As long as even in the core countries average inﬂation is stuck below 1 per cent, this puts severe additional
pressure on wages and prices to fall in the crisis countries. There have already been dramatic cuts in real wages
implemented in the public sector in many periphery countries. But ample evidence suggests that negative nominal
wage adjustments in the private sector are extremely hard to enforce. It is much easier to implement adjustments in
real wages via inﬂation, while keeping nominal wages constant. But as growth in the Eurozone is stagnating, the
lower the overall rate of inﬂation, the longer the adjustment will take, threatening to reinforce a process of long run
stagnation.
Alas, challenges in the Eurozone are even more dramatic. Stagnant or falling wages and prices aggravate the real
burden of debt, resulting in severe losses for debtors. High real rates make it increasingly diﬃcult to service the debt
– the more so since most private loans and interest rates were locked in at a time when inﬂation expectations were
well anchored around 2 per cent. In many crisis countries like Ireland, Spain and Portugal, indebtedness of private
households exceeds those of the public sector. Debt deﬂation puts enormous strains on consumption in these
countries at a time when unemployment rates are soaring. Of course, unexpectedly low rates of inﬂation may result
in gains for creditors. But that is true only as long as the debt is likely to be repaid. As the rising real debt burden
increases the risk of defaults in the periphery, creditors in the core countries may also turn out to be losers from this
development.
How can low inﬂation be addressed?
So there are good (or rather bad) reasons to be concerned about inﬂation being on the wrong track in the Eurozone.
The tricky part is how to ﬁght low inﬂation. With interest rates already close to zero, standard monetary policy
virtually ceases to be eﬀective. During the last months, the ECB tried hard to ease ﬁnancial conditions using some
non-standard monetary policy measures, both by providing ultra-cheap loans targeted to those banks lending to
small and medium-sized enterprises and by purchasing private sector assets (covered bonds and asset backed
securities). Up to now, however, the success has been fairly limited.
Even though borrowing rates for households and businesses are falling also in stressed economies, lending activity
to non-ﬁnancials is still depressed and inﬂation outlook steadily deteriorating. TheECB’s balance sheet has
contracted further – an unfortunate feature of “passive tightening”. Since 2007, other central banks (the Fed, the
Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank and recently even the Bank of Japan) have expanded their balance sheet
much more forcefully than the ECB. In all these countries, unconventional monetary policy via massive quantitative
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easing (mainly by purchasing government bonds) helped to stabilise inﬂation without triggering inﬂationary spirals.
Apart from political resistance to such measures, the speciﬁc structure in the Eurozone (the lack of a central ﬁscal
counterpart for the ECB and the resulting absence of “safe assets” – government debt issued by a central ﬁscal
agency a central bank can buy and sell without any credit risk) imposes tough limits on the feasibility of
unconventional policy measures. Given this structure, there are strong incentives for the ECB to avoid potential
ﬁscal risks. This creates a natural tendency to act too cautiously. Unfortunately, however, not acting is likely to
impose ﬁscal risks that are even larger. For that reason, decisive actions are needed to combat the risk of inﬂation
being too low.
Aiming to expand its balance sheet by 1 trillion, the ECB most likely will launch a massive quantitative easing
programme on 22 January, with outright purchases of government bonds, despite strong resistance from the
Bundesbank. At the same time, the ECB is likely to try to stick to “pure” monetary policy operation in order to avoid
taking on Euro area ﬁscal tail risk. So presumably credit risk of sovereign debt purchases will remain on the balance
sheets of national central banks. By attempting to minimise real sharing of risk, the likely impact of such
unconventional measures is bound to be rather limited.
In the absence of debt mutualisation, spreads on peripheral market debt may even increase, thus reinforcing the
fragmentation of monetary policy. The most obvious recipe for success at the Zero Lower Bound is one that requires
coordination between the monetary and ﬁscal authorities. For example, at the start of its quantitative easing
programme the Bank of England was assured that any potential losses it may incur will be indemniﬁed by the UK
Treasury. As long as policymakers in the Eurozone are reluctant to take similar urgent action, eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy is bound to be severely hampered.
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